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IN JANUARY 2017, Chinese security agents entered 
Hong Kong’s Four Seasons Hotel and left with Xiao 
Jianhua 肖建华. Once described by the New York 
Times as China’s banker for the ruling class, Xiao, 
a self-made billionaire, ranked thirty-two on the 
2016 Hurun Report’s China Rich List. It is rumoured 
that Xiao’s clients and connections include 
members of Xi Jinping’s family. Xiao was escorted 
to the mainland in contravention of Hong Kong 
law, and his companies have been put up for sale. 
Of Xiao himself, as of year’s end, nothing has been 
heard.1 Xiao was but the latest in a series of such 
disappearances since 2012.2 In China, prosperity is 




















































For centuries, many Chinese prayed to 
Caishen 财神, the God of Wealth, to prosper 
and preserve their wealth. Fortune was hard 
won but easily lost, often thanks to arbitrary 
seizure by rapacious officials in imperial 
times, through to the Republican Era (1912–
1949), and especially during socialism under 
Mao (1949–1976). As Xiao’s case shows, it re-
mains so. As a result, the wealthy have long 
seen the need to use their wealth to accrue sta-
tus, social capital, and political connections to 
protect themselves. 
These features were again reflected in 2017, most notably in the saga 
of exiled billionaire Guo Wengui 郭文贵, the apparent fall from grace of 
billionaire Wang Jianlin (see China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, pp.281–
282), more revelations of offshore holdings in tax havens courtesy of 
the Paradise Papers, official warnings about ‘Grey Rhinos’ 灰犀牛 (large 
overlooked dangers), and debate in Australia, New Zealand, and else-
where about the influence of other wealthy Chinese linked to the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).
Caishen’s re-emergence is a sign that, despite apparent economic suc-
cess, many still worry that any gains can also easily disappear. Compli-
cating matters are lingering Confucian beliefs that business is ipso facto 
corrupt and conducted by ‘small people’ 小人, not people of virtue 君子	
— a mindset reinforced by the Mao-led communist revolution (1949–1976) 
to eliminate capitalism and ‘selfish’ economic behaviour. Despite the post-
1978 economic reforms, this suspicion has never quite disappeared and 
has been compounded by the knowledge that much wealth today is taint-
ed. The revelations of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign confirm such 
suspicions. China’s wealthy are caught between popular admiration of 
their material success and the possibility of sudden official moral or po-
litical condemnation — or worse, as Xiao Jianhua discovered first hand.  
Caishen: The God of Wealth
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From Ming to Mao
Under the Ming (1368–1644) and especially the Qing dynasties (1644–
1911), officials encouraged small enterprises but were wary of the rich 
who might cause unrest by exploiting the weak or concentrating wealth.3 
The wealthy therefore sought social legitimacy through philanthropy in-
cluding building temples, schools, roads and the like. Because Chinese re-
lied then as now, on personal relationships rather than a clear system of 
laws 靠人不靠治, charity and public works were ways of being seen as 
virtuous by society and acquiring friends in high places. 
After establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 
1949, the CCP under Mao set about building autarkic communism, in-
cluding by ‘encouraging’ the wealthy to socialise their assets by handing 
them over to cooperatives or by confiscating them. All private business, 
private property, and ‘selfish’ profit were to be eliminated. The so-called 
capitalists then underwent ‘thought reform’, in order to become prole-
tarian in their thinking. However, to rebuild war-ravaged industry, some 
businessmen were allowed continued prominence as part of the All- 
China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). The China Demo-
cratic National Construction Association or Min Jian, represented such 
people in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) as 
one of China’s eight ‘democratic parties’ 民主党派 under the control of the 
United Front Work Department (UFWD). A key CCP department, the UFWD 
was responsible for liaising with and integrating or eliminating allies 
including ‘capitalists’.4  
The Three-Anti (1951) and the Five-Anti (1952) campaigns, meanwhile 
targetted alleged corruption, bribery, tax evasion, cheating on government 
contracts, and the stealing of state secrets. Many suffered in labour camps 
and/or were driven to suicide while business was again discredited. 
Among the few to escape were ‘red capitalists’ such as Rong Yiren 
荣毅仁, an heir to a business conglomerate who remained in Shanghai 




















































others as role models. In 1951, 
he reputedly tried to formally 
join the CCP but was told by 
Mayor Chen Yi 陈毅 that he 
would be more useful as a 
non-member. Rong was protect-
ed during the Cultural Revolu-
tion by Premier Zhou Enlai 周
恩来 — a sure sign of his privi-
leged status, and was quickly ‘rehabilitated’ in the Deng era. He did secret-
ly join the CCP in 1985, although this was only revealed after his death.5 
As a reward for his devotion, in 1993 Rong was appointed a vice-president 
of China. Not long after, his son, Larry Yung 荣智健, who had moved to in 
Hong Kong in the early 1990s, became chairman of CITIC Pacific, an off-
shoot of CITIC (China International Trust Investment Corporation), a semi-
state-owned investment company that Rong helped found in 1979 with the 
support of the UFWD, ACFIC, and Min Jian.6 The boundaries between the 
Party and business were deliberately obscured but with the ‘private’ aspect 
now emphasised. Though there is no clear current equivalent of Rong 
Yiren, the very personable Alibaba Billionaire, ‘Jack’ Yun Ma 马云, is per-
haps the closest contender. Though Ma is only a member of the Zhejiang 
provincial CPPCC, given his increasing prominence, it may not be long be-
fore he too is promoted to the central-level CPPCC.
 The post-Mao economic reforms allowed a revival of fortunes for 
surviving 1940s business people, with the UFWD encouraging them to 
establish new enterprises and get once-frowned-upon ‘patriotic’ friends 
and relatives abroad to invest in their ‘ancestral land’ 祖国. This United 
Front work encouraging overseas Chinese investment became a major 
factor in China’s development. It also resulted in a new generation of 
wealthy Chinese, both local and overseas, with close CCP connections, of-
ten reflected by prestigious and protective appointments to the various 
levels of the CPPCC.
Rong Yiren, 1951
Source: Wikimedia Commons
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE,   
by Yang Qin
The anti-corruption television 
drama In the Name of the People 
人民的名义 was a massive hit in 
2017, gripping audiences from 
the broadcast of the first episode 
in March. The fifty-two-episode 
drama, based on a novel by Zhou 
Meisen 周梅森,  had captured a 
record ten per cent average of 
Chinese viewers nationally, rack-
ing up over 7.7 billion views on just one licensed platform, iQiyi, alone.  
After a decade of strict censorship of social and reality television dramas by the State 
Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, In the Name of the Peo-
ple struck many as tremendously bold, even if it was ‘on message’ with President Xi Jin-
ping’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign; some have even compared it with Netflix’s  
House of Cards. 
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate commissioned the series, which also lists among 
its producers the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and the Central Military Commission. 
Hunan Television, a leading broadcaster of television entertainment programs and the pri-
mary online distributor of this drama, PPTV, had made a good bet on the show despite 
initial funding problems and low expectations for success. 
The story begins when a director at the central Ministry of Land and Resources — a position 
famously prone to corruption in the bureaucracy — is, despite a carefully cultivated reputation 
for austerity, found to have in his suburban villa huge amounts of cash that he has amassed 
through bribery. The investigation is headed by Hou Liangping, a determined young official 
from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. The director’s downfall — kneeling and weeping for 
mercy before the young official — is just the beginning of the young investigator’s campaign 
to uncover the truth behind corrupt goings-on within a state-owned enterprise (SOE). As the 
story unfolds, Hou uncovers entangled relationships involving local officials past and present 
in the fictive province of Handong. There are scenes of sexual bribery, nepotism, heavying by 
gangsters in labour disputes, and other abuses of power by government officials. 
The unprecedented revelation of corruption behind the scenes has evoked passionate 
responses from audiences, with the series becoming a major topic of conversation for old 
and young in the early months of 2017. A sea of online commentary from China’s lively 
netizen community ranged from casual gossip about love, women, and marriage, to more 
serious ones of social stratum, bureaucracy, and governance. There was also quite a bit of 
liveliness and humour, with some writing funny songs and creating emojis based on charac-
ters in the show, and making stars of the actors they nicknamed the ‘Handong Boys’. 
In November 2017, a lawsuit ensured that this drama remained in the limelight. An accu-
sation was made that one of its main plots was plagiarised from a former journalist’s publi-
cation in 2010, as the two share similar scenes of worker protests, government regulation, 
and gangster interference surrounding the selling and reform of an SOE. The scriptwriter 
for In the Name of the People denied the accusation, making the point that this particular 
plot is typical of Chinese enterprise reform during past decades. While the outcome of the 
lawsuit is still pending (at the time of publication), it ’s hard to argue with this point. 





















































In the countryside, the re-
vival of rural markets in the 
late-1970s meant that farmers 
were again allowed to sell pro-
duce for profit. Rural entrepre-
neurs soon emerged, many of 
whom had been landlords or 
successful farmers before los-
ing everything to revolution-
ary land redistribution in the 
early 1950s. They traded in food and raw materials, then often moved into 
transport, food processing, and small-scale manufacturing. These changes 
gave rise to so-called ‘explosive wealth’ 爆发户 before much change was 
seen elsewhere.
In towns and cities where workers and government employees were 
suffering under inflation for the first time since 1950, there was consider-
able envy. Among the resentful were university students and staff whose 
protests, including against the rising corruption accompanying rising 
wealth, culminated in the Tiananmen protests of 1989.
In the cities too, there was a rise in entrepreneurship. Many, including 
those who could not find work in regular state work units, or danwei 单位,	
for reasons including negative political assessments in their personal files, 
became individual entrepreneurs — peddlers and tradespeople. Though 
often despised as profiteers, many of these entrepreneurs supported the 
students protesting in 1989. 
The Beijing Massacre of 4 June 1989 and subsequent political suppres-
sion caused many business people to worry that the Party was returning 
to its Maoist roots, and those who could fled abroad.  
In part due to the 1989 protests, the Party also became acutely aware 
of the potential danger of a financially independent middle class and new 
rich. Both Western democratic theory and Marxism hold that propertied 
classes will demand electoral democracy to protect their interests and 
Lamborghinis parked in a street in Shanghai
Photo: Joshua, Flickr
property. To forestall this, the CCP raised the status of the ACFIC and relat-
ed United Front work. In 2002, Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin 江泽
民, through his theory of the ‘Three Represents’ 三个代表, claimed that the 
CCP also represents China’s ‘advanced social productive forces’ and for the 
first time ever invited business people to join the Party.
In 2007, the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) ratified constitutional 
changes recognising a right to private property. However, any compari-
sons to Western property rights and assumptions about business obscure 
these unique relationships between history, the Party-state system, suc-
cess, United Front Work, and fear of loss. These factors also help explain 
the actions of some of China’s wealthy, at home and abroad. 
Today’s Billionaires and Power
The US Congress has no billionaires. China’s National People’s Congress 
has some one hundred of them. With 609 in total as of 2017, China has 
more billionaires than America.7 And their wealth is growing faster than 
the economy overall.8  
China’s rich are amongst the strongest supporters of the Party-state 
system in large part because their prosperity owes so much to it, despite 
their need to curry favour to protect themselves. While Xiao Jianhua’s fate 
is still unclear, his extra-legal abduction is a good illustration that wealth 
alone is not enough protection. 
The Extraordinary Case of Guo Wengui
The most dramatic example of these complex relations between wealth 
and the Party-state in 2017 has undoubtedly been the case of real estate 
billionaire Guo Wengui 郭文贵, also known as Miles Kwok, a conspicu-
ous member of Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Club. Guo fled China in 2014 




















































hunter’ 权力猎手 for his corruption and shady 
links with officials.9 Once in exile, Guo made 
an escalating series of claims about corruption 
by others, particularly Wang Qishan 王岐山, 
the Secretary of the CCP’s key anti-corruption 
body, the Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection. Guo, who paints himself as a patriotic 
whistleblower, has insisted that he is only trying 
to support Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 
anti-corruption campaign. 
Soon after Guo began alleging corruption in 
high places, the CCP retaliated by revealing the arrest of his close associ-
ate, Ma Jian 马建, formerly a vice-minister of state security. In a televised 
confession, Ma alleged that since 2008, he worked with Guo to spy on, in-
terfere with, and even jail Guo’s competitors in an ‘alliance of shared in-
terests’. In some cases, Ma himself rang competitors to emphasise Guo’s 
connections. In return, Guo allegedly paid Ma some sixty million yuan in 
properties, cash, and gifts.10 Most shockingly, Ma’s confession demonstrat-
ed that even the most sensitive parts of the Party-state system could be 
bought, if the price was right.
Guo’s collusion with Ma was only the most dramatic in a long list of 
activities in which Guo worked with officials to get rich. Jailed for fraud 
in the early 1990s, Guo became a real estate entrepreneur in Zhengzhou, 
where he cultivated close relations with local Party Secretary, Wang Youjie 
王有杰. This allowed Guo to acquire prime real estate near the railway 
station for his first skyscraper and in turn he appointed Wang’s son to his 
company board. 
In anticipation of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Guo then acquired land 
near the proposed site but soon ran into serious planning and payment 
disputes with officials. As a result, the land was resumed by Beijing Vice- 
Mayor Liu Zhihua 刘志华. In retaliation, and using his security apparatus 
Guo Wengui
Source: Wikipedia
connections, Guo then entrapped Liu with a sex tape. After Liu was arrest-
ed in 2006, Guo was able to regain the land and built his famous Pangu 
Plaza. He subsequently used rooms in its hotel to tape officials’ dalliances 
with prostitutes to blackmail them. He also became friends with Ling Ji-
hua 令计划, subsequently head of the UFWD itself, until a car crash involv-
ing Ling’s son (see China Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising China, pp.24–25) 
exposed Ling’s web of corruption.  
Guo’s membership of Mar-a-Lago fits his pattern of ‘talking flattery 
to power’. In October, he even met Steve Bannon, Trump’s former ad-
viser — who had met secretly with Wang Qishan in September.11 As in 
China, Guo has invested in American connections to power and legitimacy 
while pursuing his multipronged media campaign aimed (unsuccessfully) 
at influencing the Nineteenth Party Congress, presumably to get himself 
off the corruption charges he was facing at home. After all, he might be 
forgiven if he is useful enough or if others he has cultivated or blackmailed 
in the past rise to power.
Using Twitter, video streaming, radio and press interviews, Guo went 
all out to present himself as a patriot (‘My only goal is to save China’), 
producing a series of often incredible claims and documents purporting 
to prove elite corruption, notably by Wang Qishan. Though excluding 
Xi Jinping, Guo denounced numerous other leaders as ‘a tiny group of 
Mafioso’.12 For much of the year he seemed to be attempting to both qual-
ify for asylum in America and win the support of Xi himself (unlikely). By 
year’s end, he was calling for regime change, actions which may make any 
claim for asylum more creditable.13 
The CCP took unprecedented measures to silence Guo. It apparent-
ly managed to have a live Voice of America (VOA) radio interview with 
him cut short — a clear compromise to the broadcaster’s independence. 
Some VOA staff were suspended as a result.14 In China, he was roundly de-
nounced, and in December senior employees, including one of his broth-




















































Numerous Chinese nationals launched 
court cases against Guo. Among them was a 
vice-minister of housing, who sued him for 
$US10 million for alleging that she trad-
ed in sexual favours and was corrupt;16 a 
hedge fund for US$88 million for default-
ing on debts and seeking a restraint over 
his US$68 million New York apartment;17 
and actress Fan Bingbing 范冰冰, who 
threatened to sue over his claims that she 
had slept with Wang Qishan.18  
Perhaps most dramatic were the allegations of rape levelled against 
Guo by a former personal assistant. This became the basis for a second 
Interpol red notice warrant for him.19 The first, in April, was instigated by 
Beijing alleging corruption. Since 2016, Interpol has been headed by Chi-
nese Vice-Minister of Public Security, Meng Hongwei 孟宏伟. A day after 
alleged Chinese interference saw his talk to Washington’s Hudson Institute 
cancelled, Guo claimed Beijing had 25,000 spies in the US. Guo’s claims 
had some credence because of his association with Ma Jian, once respon-
sible for aspects of counter intelligence.20 
Guo also ended up being suspended from social media platforms: 
his Twitter account was suspended briefly in April following a similar 
interruption to his Facebook account,21 while in October his YouTube 
account was also suspended.22 These incidents vividly demonstrate 
the increasing ability of the CCP to directly interfere with social media 
worldwide — despite Twitter being banned in China. That Guo has 466,000 
Twitter followers makes him even more of a worry, and the CCP’s desire 
to increase ideological and United Front Work abroad even more 
pressing.
Guo’s case is the most dramatic exposé of official–private collusion 
since the Bo Xilai–Wang Lijun case of 2012 (see the China Yearbook 2012: 
Wang Jianlin, January 2017
Source: World Economic Forum, Flickr
Red Rising, Red Eclipse) and again highlights just how deep and pernicious 
the relationships between power, corruption, and wealth can be in a Party- 
state system. 
One way to keep any gains is, of course, to send it abroad. It was not 
clear how Guo still had access to money after fleeing China. In November 
2017, however, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
revealed a second set of leaks about tax havens — the Paradise Papers. In 
2016, the Panama Papers had revealed that Li Xiaolin 李小琳, the daughter 
of former leader Li Peng 李鹏, and even Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law, Deng 
Jiahui 邓家贵,	had been using tax havens to stash their wealth. Some nine 
companies related to Wang Jianlin 王健林, the real estate billionaire of 
Wanda fame who came to Western attention in 2016 for buying up the-
atres and studios in the US (see the China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, 
pp.281–282), used tax havens in the Bahamas, the Virgin Islands, and Lux-
embourg.23 There are likely to be many more wealthy Chinese seeking to 
hide their assets this way.
If You Can’t Beat ‘em…
If not for the Caixin revelations, there is a chance that Guo would have 
sought, or been sought out, to join the CCP, be elected to an NPC at some 
level, or selected by the UFWD as a representative in the CPPCC. The sta-
tus afforded by these bodies was reflected when, in March, the Liaoning 
NPC expelled forty-five members, nearly all businessmen, for having pur-
chased their seats. However, the situation only came to light when Bei-
jing’s favoured candidates failed to get elected.24  
This keenness to be seen to be a part of the Party-state is understand-
able. Proximity to power means privileged access to decision-makers, li-
cences, bank loans, and higher level connections, and especially to scarce 
real estate as Guo’s case reflects. At its best, this creates a virtuous cycle; at 




















































Aspects of positive symbiotic business–
Party relationships are evident with some of 
the Chinese billionaires who have come to 
prominence in Australia. In the China Sto-
ry Yearbook 2016, we discussed the role of 
Huang Xiangmo 黄向墨, his donations to Aus-
tralian political parties and his role in United 
Front activities. On 6 June 2017, a joint inves-
tigation by the ABC’s Four Corners program 
and Fairfax screened, called ‘Power and In-
fluence: The Hard Edge of China’s Soft Pow-
er’, about United Front-linked money and Australian politics.25 One ABC 
report revealed how almost six million dollars had gone to politicians of 
both major parties.26 In this and subsequent investigations and reports, 
notably about the Australian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Re-
unification, headed by Huang, there were a number of revelations about 
UFWD work in Australia.27 The Council’s front page even links directly to 
UFWD-linked organisations. 
Another prominent businessman and philanthropist, Chau Chak-
wing 周泽荣,	who is an ACPRRC member as well as an Australian citi-
zen of twenty years, came to public attention in 2017, in part because of 
his connections with Huang and subsequently because of his decision to 
sue the ABC and Fairfax for defamation in relation to their revelations. 
In a later interview, he denied any wrongdoing and, most pertinently, 
declared, ‘For the record, I have never been a member of the Chinese 
Communist Party and I have never been a member of an advisory group 
called the People’s Political Consultative Conference’. He went on to say 
that, ‘As to the entity referred to by the ABC as the “United Front Work 
Department”, I have no idea what this is’.28  
Chau’s rise to wealth and power, however, seems intimately connect-
ed to his relations with the UFWD in his home province of Guangdong, 
Dr Chau Chak Wing 
Source: UTS Advancement, Flickr
and in particular the Chaozhou region and his city of birth, Shantou. 
Within Guangdong, Chau is officially lauded as an outstanding overseas 
Chinese entrepreneur. According to the Shantou UFWD, Chau migrat-
ed to Hong Kong in the 1970s and then to Australia, returning to China 
in 1988. There he became involved in real estate, food, and media. The 
Department also stresses his contributions to charity, including building 
schools. His appointments include being a deputy chair of the China Fed-
eration of Returned Overseas Chinese Association. The photos of Chau 
include ones with former leader Hu Jintao and former Australian prime 
minister, Kevin Rudd.29    
Chau’s return to Shantou was timely, coming when the UFWD was 
actively wooing overseas Chinese investors to contribute their money and 
talents to building up their ancestral land, and profit at the same time. 
In July 2007, at Guangdong’s Oriental Hotel and in the presence of the 
Provincial Head of the UFWD, Zhou Zhenlong 周镇宏, Chau launched the 
Guangdong Overseas Chinese Commercial Investor Industry Association. 
Its precursor association launched in 1990, said Chau, had been the earli-
est such organisation in China and had played a major role in attracting 
investment under the auspices of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (the 
government face of the UFWD).30 Chau’s closeness to the UFWD, then, is 
long-standing. 
On 30 November, Chau’s efforts to court influential non-Chinese for-
mer leaders and people of influence by hosting meetings to discuss China’s 
international relations reached its apogee. Guests at his Imperial Springs 
International Forum, held at Chau’s palatial Imperial Springs Hotel in 
Guangdong, included former United Nations head, Ban Ki-moon and 
former New Zealand prime minister, Jenny Shipley. Their presence and 
discussions of China’s international relations was rewarded in dramatic 
style when Chau and his guests were invited to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping 





















































The Fall of a Grey Rhino
What the Party giveth, it can also take 
away. One real estate billionaire with 
very good connections to the Party, 
Wang Jianlin of Wanda, mentioned 
above in connection with the tax ha-
vens, had been able to access loans large 
enough to bid for Hollywood studios 
and cinema chains at least partly be-
cause the purchases supported Chinese 
soft power, in particular an increase in 
Chinese influence over international 
media. Many of the deals hyped up in 
2016, however, fell through in 2017.32 
Then, in July, Wanda was one of a number of large private firms with 
good connections that were criticised in the People’s Daily as ‘grey rhi-
nos’ 灰犀牛.33 The paper explained ‘A grey rhino is massive, and responds 
slowly — you can see it clearly in the distance, but if it charges you, it will 
catch you off guard and gore you’.34 Today’s rhinos are big companies now 
struggling under huge debts and therefore posing an economic threat. Re-
sponsibility for these loans, rather than being sheeted home to the officials 
who approved them, was placed on the companies themselves. By the end 
of August, there were repeated rumours, subsequently refuted, that Wang 
was under suspicion for corruption and unable to leave China. While 
Wang remains free, by the end of 2017, he had gone very quiet.
Conclusion
While wealth in China brings many benefits, it brings only limited pro-
tection if it is not also supported by officialdom, the higher the better. 
Beijing Wanda Plaza (headquarters for Wanda 
Group and Wanda Cinemas)
Source: Dennis Deng, Flickr
It should not be surprising then, if Chinese business people abroad also 
assume that similar situations apply in foreign environments and act ac-
cordingly by seeking access and possible protection from the local polit-
ical elites. Such behaviours though, make it very difficult for others to 
judge intentions and where the boundaries between private initiative and 
Party-state influence might lie, if indeed there are any. Cases like that 
of Guo Wengui make such judgements even harder. The ramifications of 
these dilemmas are only just beginning to make themselves felt in Aus-
tralia and elsewhere.
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